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1 Introduction
Even though economists have been trying to understand the e¤ects of the
intensity of competition on R&D-investment for decades, the issue remains
unsettled. Reasonable theoretical models can support positive, negative or
non-monotone relations between competition and investment. These ambi-
guities reect many modeling di¤erences, concerning in particular the mean-
ing of increasing competition.4 Similarly, empirical research also has been
inconclusive.5
This paper provides a uniform framework for analyzing the e¤ects of
competition on investment in a transparent way. Rather than attempting to
identify an unambiguous relation between competition and investment, I ask:
How does the e¤ect of increasing competition on cost-reducing investments
depend on characteristics of rms, technologies, markets and institutions, and
on the specic notion of competition? The paper is not just of theoretical
value. It provides a framework for empirical analysis, because it leads to
various testable implications.
The model captures several notions of increasing competition and dif-
ferent types of oligopolies. To reveal the intuition in the most transparent
fashion, I opted for simplicity otherwise by considering a two stage-duopoly.
One rm (the leader) may be exogenously more e¢ cient than the other one
(the laggard), that is, it may have lower marginal costs.6 Firms simultane-
ously choose cost-reducing investments before they engage in product market
competition, which is treated in reduced form.7 Many well-known examples
are special cases. The main contributions are as follows.
The reduced form framework helps to understand the economic intuition
behind these results and can be applied to many other examples. In par-
ticular, I identify four transmission channels by which competition a¤ects
investment. Specically, I obtain the following observations concerning the
4See Gilbert (2006) and Schmutzler (2009) for recent surveys.
5See Gilbert (2006) for an elaboration of this point.
6We also allow for the case that both rms are identical.
7The setting rules out situations where the investments are not observable by competi-
tors and therefore have no strategic e¤ect in the product market. Vives (2008) considers
this case.
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determinants of the e¤ects of competition on investment: (i) Increases in the
initial e¢ ciency of a rm relative to the competitor support a positive e¤ect
of competition on investment. (ii) Higher positive spillovers work towards
a negative e¤ect of competition on investment. (iii) Increases in the initial
level of competition have an ambiguous e¤ect on the relation between fur-
ther competition and investment; expressed di¤erently, U-shaped and inverse
U-shaped relations between competition and innovation are possible.
Section 2 introduces the general model and denes competition in terms
of its e¤ects on equilibrium outputs and margins. It also presents examples
of the general model and shows how competition a¤ects investments in these
examples. Section 3 derives properties of prots as functions of costs and the
competition parameter. Section 4 discusses the comparative statics implica-
tions of these properties within the basic model. Section 5 discusses related
literature very briey.8 Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
I shall consider a class of two-stage games. The assumptions are formulated
as relations between equilibrium outputs and margins on the one hand and
the degree of competition and the cost structure of the rms on the other.
These assumptions are intuitively plausible, and they will be shown to apply
in the examples below (see Section 2.2).
2.1 Game Structure
2.1.1 Basics
Initially, rm i 2 f1; 2g has constant marginal cost c0i . In period 1, given
(c01; c
0
2), rms i = 1; 2 choose investments yi, with an increasing and convex
cost function K(yi). In period 2, rm i has marginal costs ci = c0i   yi yj,
where  2 [0; 1] is a spillover parameter and j 6= i. It will often be convenient
to specify an arbitrary exogenous reference level c 2 R and to write Y 0i =
8See Schmutzler (2009) for a more detailed treatment of related literature.
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c c0i and Yi = c ci for the rms e¢ ciency level before and after investment.9
Clearly, Yi = Y 0i + yi + yj.
A parameter  2   R captures the intensity of competition; here
 =

; 

or  =

; 
	
for some  < . The dening properties of  will be
introduced in Section 2.1.2.
The demand function for rm i is qi (pi; pj; ); it is weakly decreasing
(increasing) in pi (pj). The product-market game is assumed to have a unique
pure Nash equilibrium for each  2  and (Y1; Y2) 2 Y 

Y 1; Y 1
Y 2; Y 2,
where Y i  c and Y i  c c0i (i = 1; 2).10 The Nash equilibrium corresponds
to prices pi (Yi; Yj; ) for i = 1; 2; j 6= i.11 I assume that pi (Yi; Yj; ) is weakly
decreasing in Yi and Yj, j 6= i. The following notation will be used:
1. Equilibrium margins M i (Yi; Yj; )  pi (Yi; Yj; )  c+ Yi
2. Equilibrium outputs Qi (Yi; Yj; )  qi (pi (Yi; Yj; ) ; pj (Yi; Yj; ) ; )
3. Gross equilibrium prots i (Yi; Yj; ) = M i (Yi; Yj; ) Qi (Yi; Yj; )
I will assume thatM i, Qi and thus i are twice continuously di¤erentiable
in Yi and Yj and, whenever  =

; 

, continuously di¤erentiable in all vari-
ables wherever the respective function takes positive values. I use subscripts
to denote partial derivatives of these functions. For instance, M ii  @M
i
@Yi
,
M ij  @M
i
@Yj
, M i  @M
i
@
, M iij  @
2M i
@Yi@Yj
, M ii  @
2M i
@Yi@
and M ij  @
2M i
@Yj@
. Analo-
gous notation applies to Qi and i.
The following convention will be used:
Convention: Whenever I refer to the functions M i, Qi and i and their
derivatives as being decreasing (increasing) in an argument, this property is
required to be strict only on the set of (Yi; Yj; ) 2

Y i; Y i
  Y j; Y j  
such that  >  and Qi (Yi; Yj; ) > 0 and Qj (Yj; Yi; ) > 0.
This convention takes care of the possibility that changes of a variable
have no e¤ect in some parameter regions because the rm is so ine¢ cient
9The choice of c is arbitrary; to simplify calculations, I usually choose c = 0 or c = a,
where a is the maximal willingness to pay for any unit of the good.
10The restrictions reect the requirement that 0  ci  c0i .
11For price competition, pi (Yi; Yj ; ) is the equilibrium price; for quantity competition,
it denotes the market clearing price for equilibrium outputs.
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that outputs, margins and prots are zero. It also allows for the possibility
that, when competition is very weak, the e¢ ciency of the competitor has no
e¤ect on own outputs, margins and prots.
The following assumptions will be made throughout the paper, and they
hold in examples E1-E5 below.
(A1) Qi (Yi; Yj; ) is (i) increasing in Yi, (ii) decreasing in Yj, j 6= i.
A1(i) requires that the output increase implied by the own price reduc-
tion dominates the output reduction from the competitor price reduction;
similarly for (ii). In line with the above convention, I do not require strict
monotonicity everywhere for two reasons. First, when one rm has su¢ -
ciently low Yi, its outputs may be zero and thus constant for non-degenerate
sets of Yi; Yj; . Second, if  =  corresponds to the case that rms produce
su¢ ciently unrelated products that rms do not compete, it is natural to
assume that Qi is independent of Yj, at least when there are no spillovers.
(A2) M i (Yi; Yj; ) is (i) increasing in Yi, (ii) decreasing in Yj, j 6= i.
As M i (Yi; Yj; ) = pi (Yi; Yj; )  c+ Yi and M ii = @p
i
@Yi
+ 1, A2(i) requires
that cost reductions are larger than induced price reductions; similarly for
(ii).
The investment game reduces to a one-stage game with payo¤ functions
i (yi; yj; ) = 
i
 
Y 0i + yi + yj; Y
0
j + yj + yi; 
 K(yi). (1)
I assume that there exists a unique interior subgame perfect equilibrium
(y1 (Y
0
1 ; Y
0
2 ; ) ; y2 (Y
0
1 ; Y
0
2 ; )).
12 For simplicity, I write yi ()  yi
 
Y 0i ; Y
0
j ; 

.
2.1.2 Dening competition
I now introduce intuitive assumptions on the relation between  and equi-
librium outputs and margins. These assumptions hold in examples E1-E5
below and in many other examples.13
12Often, equilibria where only one rm invests coexist with the symmetric equilibria.
Also, in some parameter regions all pure-strategy equilibria are asymmetric. I ignore such
equilibria in the following.
13Appendix 2 gives the margins and outputs for E1-E5.
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(C1) M i (Yi; Yj; ) is decreasing in :
The property that competition reduces margins is standard.
(C2) Qii is increasing in .
Thus the positive e¤ect of lower costs on output is higher when competi-
tion is intense, reecting the increasing relevance of business-stealing.
For the next property, the following denition is useful:
Denition 1 (i) Firm i with e¢ ciency level Y mi is marginal given (Yj; )
if Qi (Yi; Yj; ) = M i (Yi; Yj; ) = 0 for all Yi  Y mi and Qi (Yi; Yj; ) > 0 and
M i (Yi; Yj; ) > 0 for all Yi > Y mi . Firm i is potentially marginal given
(Yj; ) if there exists a Y mi 2

Y i; Y i

such that rm i is marginal given
(Yj; ) if it has e¢ ciency level Y mi .
(ii) Firm i is dominant given (Yi; ) if Yj  Y mj for j 6= i. Firm i is
potentially dominant given (Yj; ) if there exists a Y di 2

Y i; Y i

such that
rm i is dominant given (Yj; ).
Thus, a marginal rm is too weak to compete, whereas a dominant rm
captures the entire market. Intuitively, for a rm i to be potentially mar-
ginal, the other rm has to be su¢ ciently strong (Yj high) and competition
su¢ ciently intense; for a rm to be potentially dominant, the other rm has
to be su¢ ciently weak (Yj low) and competition has to be su¢ ciently intense.
(C3) For every Yj 2

Y j; Y j

and  2 , there exists a Y i = Y i (Yj; ) 2
Y i; Y i

such that Qi is increasing in  for Yi > Y i , and decreasing in 
for Yi < Y i . If rm i is potentially marginal, then Y

i = Y

i (Yj; ) > Y i.
If rm i is potentially dominant, then Y i = Y

i (Yj; ) < Yi.
(C3) reects the idea that competition redistributes output from rela-
tively ine¢ cient to relatively e¢ cient rms. (C3) is closely related to (C2).
This is easiest to see when Qi is twice continuously di¤erentiable in both
variables. Then by (C2), @
2Qi
@Yi@
= @
2Qi
@@Yi
 0, which implies that Qi, the e¤ect
of competition on output, is increasing in Yi. (C3) does not involve such
a monotonicity requirement, but it implies that competition has a positive
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e¤ect on outputs for rms that are close to being dominant and a negative
e¤ect for rms that are close to being marginal. Most of the analysis relies
on (C1)-(C3); the next property is only relevant for understanding the role
of spillovers.
(C4) Qij and M
i
j are decreasing in .
Thus, lower marginal costs of the competitor reduce own outputs and
margins more as competition increases.
Denition 2  is a competition parameter if (C1) - (C4) hold.
Thus, a competition parameter has the following properties: It reduces
margins; it increases output for su¢ ciently e¢ cient rms and decreases out-
put for su¢ ciently ine¢ cient rms; it increases the (positive) e¤ect of own
e¢ ciency on outputs and it increases the (negative) e¤ect of competitor e¢ -
ciency on own outputs and margins.
Clearly, other denitions of competition are conceivable. However, (C1)-
(C4) are su¢ ciently specic to rule out parameterizations which are usually
not considered as increases in competition14 and general enough to be consis-
tent with many examples. In the general model, I thus always assume that
(C1)-(C4) as well as (A1) and (A2) hold.
2.2 Examples
2.2.1 Assumptions
I consider ve investment games that are based on well-known oligopoly
models. These examples use a specic (but common) denition of competi-
tion, namely the degree of substitution, but the insights hold more generally.
The examples all satisfy (A1)-(A2) and (C1)-(C4). The section identies
aspects of the relation between competition and investment that vary across
14For instance, a symmetric increase in initial marginal costs or a reduction in the
willingness to pay usually satises (C1) and (C2), but not (C3), because the e¤ect of such
parameter changes on output is negative even for leaders. In Schmutzler (2009), I do not
impose any restrictions on the output e¤ect, which limits the implications that can be
obtained.
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examples (Observations 1 and 2), as well as properties that are robust (Ob-
servations 3 and 4). In Sections 3 and 4, I will show how Observation 1-4
can be understood as consequences of the general assumptions of the model
rather than specic aspects of the examples.
For  2 [0; 1] ; consider the inverse demand systems
D1: pi(qi; qj; ) = 1  qi   qj (2)
D2: pi (qi; qj; ) = 1  1
1 + 
qi   
1 + 
qj (3)
The corresponding demand functions qi(pi; pj) satisfy @q
i
@pj
> 0 for  > ;
thus the goods are substitutes. For  = 0, rms are monopolists;  = 1 corre-
sponds to homogeneous goods. Higher  corresponds to closer substitutes.15
In addition, I consider the demand system qi(pi; pj) = max
n
pj pi 
2
; 0
o
(D3);
this results from competition on the line à la Hotelling (where  = 1   t is
the usual transportation cost parameter).
I analyze examples E1-E5, with investment cost function K(yi) = y2i ;
where yi is the marginal cost reduction. Each of these examples results
from a combination of price or quantity competition with one of the demand
systems as follows:
2.2.2 Relation to the General Model
The following result follows directly from the formulas for equilibrium outputs
and margins given in Appendix 2.
Proposition 1 In Examples E1-E5, (A1), (A2) and (C1)-(C4) hold except
possibly if Yi  Yj.16
15The di¤erence between the demand systems is that  shifts D1 inwards, but not D2.
16 The qualication only concerns (C1), which does not hold for leaders that are su¢ -
ciently close to being dominant in E2 and E4.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Investments with Symmetric Firms
Importantly, (C1) - (C4) are not only consistent with the interpretation
of  as substitution parameter, but also with other interpretations. For in-
stance, (C1)-(C4) also hold if  =

; 
	
, with the interpretation that  = 
corresponds to Cournot competition and  =  to Bertrand competition with
parameters xed as in any of the examples E1 to E4 (see Appendix 3).17
2.2.3 Investments for symmetric rms
Figure 1 plots equilibrium investments for E1-E5, assuming that  = 0 and
initial marginal costs are given as 0:85. I focus on parameter regions where
a symmetric equilibrium exists in all cases.18
Figure 1 shows that investments can be increasing, decreasing, constant
or U-shaped as a function yi().
Observation 1: The sign of the e¤ect of competition on investment is
17The e¤ect of changes from Cournot to Bertrand competition has been analyzed by
Bester and Petrakis (1983), Delbono and Denicolò (1990) and Qiu (1997).
18In Appendix 2, I provide formulas for the equilibrium investments; the derivations are
provided in the web appendix. The U-shape for E2 has been pointed out in Sacco and
Schmutzler (2011).
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ambiguous for symmetric rms.
Moreover, the initial level of competition has no clear-cut e¤ect on the
e¤ects of increasing competition further.
Observation 2: The equilibrium investment can be a concave or convex
function of the competition parameter.
In the following, I show that the confusing picture surprisingly becomes
a lot clearer when one also includes asymmetric rms.
2.2.4 Investments for asymmetric rms
In the above examples, suppose now that there are low-cost rms (leaders)
with marginal costs 0:8 and high-cost rms (laggards) with marginal costs
0:9. Figure 2 plots equilibrium investments for E1-E5.19 The comparative
statics are similar across these examples.
Observation 3: (i) For the laggard, investments are decreasing in com-
petition. (ii) For the leader, equilibrium investments are increasing in com-
petition, at least for  beyond a certain threshold.
In all these examples, the statement not only holds for the specic cost
values of 0:8 and 0:9 for leader and laggard, respectively, but it can be shown
to hold more generally whenever the asymmetries between the two rms
are su¢ ciently large, so that one rm is su¢ ciently close to being marginal.
Moreover, in all examples, the e¤ects of competition on investments are in-
creasing in the initial e¢ ciency of a rm, and decreasing in the initial e¢ -
ciency of the competitor.20
2.2.5 The E¤ects of Spillovers
One can extend the examples by allowing for spillovers, so that rm i ob-
tains an additional cost reduction of yj (j 6= i), where  2 [0; 1] measures
spillovers. For E1, Figure 3 shows that @yi
@
is smaller with  = 1 than with
19Again, I am restricting myself to those values of  where an equilibrium with positive
investments of both rms exists for both rms even in the leader-laggard case. I also
include the symmetric case with marginal costs 0:85.
20Details are provided in the Web Appendix.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium investments with asymmetric rms
11
Figure 3: Investments with and without spillovers (Bertrand D1)
 = 1, that is, larger in absolute value. Analogous statements can be made
for examples E2-E4.21
More precisely, the following statement is shown to hold in the web ap-
pendix:
Observation 4: In E1-E4, for symmetric rms,(i) @yi
@

=1
< @yi
@

=0
and
(ii) @yi
@
is decreasing in , at least for su¢ ciently low initial values of .
Observation 4 is obviously not equivalent to the familiar statement that,
because of concerns that knowledge ows to the competitor, spillovers re-
duce investments. As Figure 3 shows for E1, investments can be higher with
spillovers than without.22 Instead, the point is that, as spillovers increase,
for any initial level of competition, an increase in competition reduces invest-
21In the Hotelling Example E5, competition has no e¤ect on equilibrium investments,
no matter what  is.
22Intuitively, this is true because the investments of the two rms are complements: The
cost reductions obtained by spillovers increase own outputs and margins and therefore
increase the value of increasing margins and outputs by investing into own cost reductions.
12
ments by a larger amount.23
2.2.6 Summary
The general model introduced in this section uses several intuitive assump-
tions. Reductions in own marginal cost and increases in competitor cost
increase own outputs and margins (A1, A2). Increasing competition lowers
margins (C1), increases the positive output e¤ects of lower marginal costs
(C2), has positive e¤ects on the outputs of su¢ ciently strong rms (Yi >
Y i ), but negative e¤ects on the outputs of su¢ ciently weak rms (Yi < Y

i )
(C3) and exacerbates the negative output and margin e¤ects of increased
competitor e¢ ciency (C4).
This section also presented ve introductory examples of investment games.
In these examples, competition refers to the degree of substitution. For sym-
metric rms, increasing competition has ambiguous e¤ects on cost-reducing
investments (Observation 1); moreover the initial level of competition has
ambiguous e¤ects on the e¤ect of further competition on investment (Obser-
vation 2). However, increasing initial e¢ ciency of a rm has a clear positive
e¤ect on the e¤ect of competition on investment (Observation 3) whereas
increases in the strength of positive spillovers have a clear negative e¤ect
(Observation 4).
These observations are not specic to the introductory examples. Similar
observations also hold in other contexts, for instance, when increasing com-
petition is interpreted as a move from Cournot to Bertrand competition.24 It
therefore seems plausible that they result from more general economic forces.
To show this, I will now return to the general framework.
3 Understanding the prot functions
This section investigates the signs of mixed partials of the prot function i,
namely ii, 
i
ij and 
i
j. The reason for doing so will become clear in Section
23In examples where the e¤ect of competition on investments is positive, spillovers reduce
the e¤ect or even lead to a negative e¤ect.
24See Appendix 3.
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4, where I provide comparative statics results in terms of these signs. First,
ii is crucial: In the case without spillovers, 
i
i, the e¤ect of an own e¢ -
ciency increase on prots, captures marginal investment incentives; ii thus
determines whether  has a positive or negative direct e¤ect on marginal in-
vestment incentives and thus in which direction  shifts the reaction functions
in (y1; y2)-space. Second, the sign of the slope of the reaction functions (de-
termined by the sign of iij) reects whether rms are strategic complements
or substitutes. It matters for indirect e¤ects that reect a players reaction
to changes in the investments of the opponent. Third, to understand the
role of spillovers, the mixed partial ij needs to be considered, because it
states how the e¤ect of e¢ ciency increases of the competitor (for instance
via spillovers) on own prots depends on competition.
3.1 Competition and investment incentives
For  = 0, marginal investment incentives can be decomposed as
ii = M
iQii +Q
iM ii (4)
M iQii is the gain from higher output (A1), the value of which depends on
the margin; QiM ii is the gain from higher margins (A2), the value of which
depends on the output level. As will be explained in Section 4.1, the compar-
ative statics of equilibrium investments with respect to  are closely related
to the sign of ii. For  = 0 (no spillovers), 
i
i = 
i
i. (4) implies
ii = Q
i
iM
i
 +M
iQii +M
i
iQ
i
 +Q
iM ii: (5)
The total e¤ect of  on @
i
@Yi
is thus the sum of four components, each of which
has a clear interpretation and can easily be calculated for each example.25
1. By (C1) M i  0 and thus Qii  M i  0: Competition reduces the
25All the statements about M i and Qi in the examples can be derived from formulas
for equilibrium outputs and margins that are provided in Appendix 2. For simplicity, we
shall formulate the statements in terms of mixed partials. It is straightforward to adapt
the statements to the case that  is a discrete set, so that di¤erentiation with respect to
 is not possible.
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prot marginM i and thus the value of increasing output by increasing
e¢ ciency. It is well-known that this e¤ect, which I call the margin
e¤ect, works towards a reduction in investment incentives.
2. By (C2) Qii  0 and thus M i  Qii  0. Competition increases the
size of the output increase resulting from higher e¢ ciency. This output
sensitivity e¤ect reects an increase in investment incentives.
3. For symmetric rms Qi  0 or Qi  0, depending on the example. If
Qi > (<)0, there is a further reason why competition might increase
(reduce) investment incentives. Competition increases (decreases) the
equilibrium output and hence the value of margin increases resulting
from investments. By (C3), the sign of the output e¤ect M ii Qi is neg-
ative for su¢ ciently weak rms (Yi < Y i ) and positive for su¢ ciently
strong rms (Yi > Y i ).
4. Because M ii = p
i
i, its sign reects whether increasing competition
forces rms to pass through e¢ ciency gains to customers. I therefore
refer to QiM ii as the cost-pass-through e¤ect. In the Cournot examples
E2 and E4, M ii  0, whereas M ii  0 for the Bertrand examples E1
and E3 and M ii = 0 for the Hotelling example E5.
26 If M ii < 0, com-
petition reduces the margin increase resulting from higher e¢ ciency,
which works in favor of a negative e¤ect of competition on investments.
If M ii > 0, the argument is reversed.
Thus, I have shown that there are four transmission channels by which
competition a¤ects marginal investment incentives. The corresponding ef-
fects of competition on investments do not all have the same sign. This fact
lies behind the ambiguous relation between competition and investment.
26For Cournot competition, higher e¢ ciency induces lower output of the competitor,
which reduces
pii. This strategic e¤ect is more relevant when goods are narrow substi-
tutes. Therefore the cost-pass-through e¤ect is positive. Under Bertrand competition,
pji  0, enhancing the price-reducing e¤ect of greater e¢ ciency. Thus, compared to the
case with little product di¤erentiation where such considerations play no role, cost reduc-
tions induce more substantial price reductions, so that
pii should increase with . Hence,
the cost-pass-through e¤ect works towards a positive relation between competition and
investment under Cournot competition, and conversely under Bertrand competition.
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For  > 0, ii = 
i
i + 
i
j. Thus, the sign of 
i
j also inuences the
sign of ii. Section 3.3 will deal with this issue.
3.2 The slope of the reaction curve
A full analysis of the e¤ects of competition on investment requires an un-
derstanding of how the reactions of a rm to a parameter change inuence
the behavior of the competitor. Thus, I explore whether investments are
strategic substitutes (iij  0) or complements (iij  0).27 To understand
the intuition, note that
iij = Q
i
i M ij +M ii Qij +M i Qiij +Qi M iij:
In linear examples like E1-E5, the last two terms disappear. iij  0 is then
implied by (A2): If the competitor invests a lot, yij (and hence Y
i
j ) is high.
Therefore,M i (Qi) is low and so are the benets from increasing own outputs
(margins) by becoming more e¢ cient. If  = 0, iij = 
i
ij, so that investments
are strategic substitutes. If  > 0, iij = 
i
ij + 
 
iii + 
i
ij + 
i
jj

. In many
examples, investments become strategic complements for su¢ ciently large
values of  due to the additional terms. For instance, in examples E2-E4,
iij > 0 for  su¢ ciently close to 1.
28 This reects the intuition that own
cost reductions and cost reductions from spillovers are complementary.29
3.3 Competition and cross prot e¤ects
To understand how spillovers a¤ect marginal investment incentives, it is im-
portant to understand the sign of ij: If it is negative, increasing compe-
tition reinforces the negative e¤ect of increasing e¢ ciency of the opponent
on a rms prot. As discussed in Section 3.1, ii = 
i
i + 
i
j. Thus, if
ij < 0, then 
i
i < 
i
i for  > 0, making it more di¢ cult for a positive
27This property has been exploited in strategic trade theory (Bagwell and Staiger, 1994).
28The calculations are in the Web Appendix. In E1 and E5 investments are strategic
substitutes for arbitrary levels of spillovers.
29In particular, iii > 0 can be positive, reecting complementarities from high own
output and high own markup. For related discussions, see Leahy and Neary (1997).
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e¤ect of competition on marginal investment incentives to arise than in the
case without spillovers. Proceeding as in (5),
ij = M
i Qij +Qi M ij +Qij M i +M ij Qi.
By (C4), M i Qij  0 and Qi M ij  0. Moreover, Qij M i  0 by (A1) and
(C1): As competition reduces margins, it reduces the negative e¤ect of the
output reduction following a competitors increase in e¢ ciency. The sign of
M ij Qi depends on whether or not Qi  0, that is, on whether or not Yi > Y i
(see (C3)). All told, the four components of ij have di¤erent signs, so that
it is not clear whether ij > 0 or 
i
j < 0. To obtain a more denitive result,
I specify the set-up in a way that is consistent with E1 to E4, but not with
E5.
(C5) For all Yi 2 R+, Qi (Yi; Yj; ) and M i (Yi; Yj; ) are independent of Yj.
(C5) reects the intuition that the minimal level of competition () cor-
responds to the case where both rms are su¢ ciently unrelated that they act
as monopolists.
Proposition 2 If (C5) holds, then there exists no

Yi; Yj;e 2 Y i; Y i 
Y j; Y j
  ;  such that ij (Yi; Yj; ) > 0 holds everywhere on ;e.
Intuitively, for monopolists cost reductions of the other rm have no e¤ect
on own prots as long as own costs remain the same, whereas the e¤ects be-
come negative as competition increases. Thus, starting from a monopoly,
competition cannot have a positive e¤ect on ij. In spite of the above-
mentioned ambiguities, the results are stronger in examples E1-E4 where,
for symmetric rms, ij  0 holds globally, rather than just for low levels of
competition.30
4 Equilibrium investments
In Section 3.1, I showed under which circumstances increases in competition
shift out the reaction curve, that is, ii  0. In Section 4.1, I will add
30Calculations are provided in the Web Appendix.
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conditions that, together with ii  0, guarantee that competition has a
weakly positive e¤ect on equilibrium investments. Section 4.2 characterizes
parameter changes that favor such an e¤ect.
4.1 Comparative statics
I now assume that  =

; 

, and i (yi; yj; ) is concave and twice contin-
uously di¤erentiable. When ii > 0,  shifts out player is reaction curve.
Total di¤erentiation of the rst-order conditions gives 
iii 
i
ij
jji 
j
jj
! 
dyi
dyj
!
=
 
 iid
 jjd
!
Solving for dyi
d
yields
dyi
d
=  
i
i
j
jj   iijjj
iii
j
jj   iijjji
. (6)
This term contains the direct e¤ect of  (shift of the reaction curve) and
a multiplier capturing indirect e¤ects (reactions to competitor adjustments).
For symmetric rms, (6) can be rewritten as
dyi
d
=   
i
i
iii + 
i
ij
=  
i
i
iii
iii
iii + 
i
ij
. (7)
The term  ii
iii
is the direct e¤ect; 
i
ii
iii+
i
ij
is the multiplier. The follow-
ing proposition, which immediately follows from (6), species a necessary
and su¢ cient condition for a weakly positive e¤ect of competition on invest-
ment.31
Proposition 3 If, for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i, the Hahn stability condition
31It is well known that similar results hold for oligopoly models (e.g. Shapiro 1989).
By switching the signs in (8), one obtains su¢ cient conditions for negative e¤ects of
competition on investment.
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(iii
j
jj > 
i
ij
j
ji) holds, then yi() is weakly increasing in  if and only if
ii 
iij
jjj
jj: (8)
Proposition 3 has the following immediate implications:
Corollary 1 If, for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i, the Hahn stability condition holds,
then yi() is weakly increasing in  if (i) or (ii) holds:
(i) ii  0 and iij  @
2i
@yi@yj
 0.
(ii) ii  0, i (yi; yj; ) is symmetric; yi() = yj() for all  considered.
To understand (i), consider Figure 4.  = L(H) refers to the situation
45°
y1
R (y ,L)1 2
y2
R (y ,H)1 2
R (y ,H)2 1
R (y ,L)2 1
y1Hy1L
y2H
y2L
Figure 4: Strategic Complements
before (after) a parameter increase. Because ii  0, reaction functions shift
out as  increases. The supermodularity condition in (i), iij = 
i
ij  0,
implies increasing reaction functions, so that the indirect e¤ects of compe-
tition reinforce the direct e¤ects. Thus, competition increases both players
investments.
However, as argued in Section 3.2, unless spillovers are large, investments
are strategic substitutes in many examples (e.g., E1-E5), so that the direct
and indirect e¤ects have opposite signs. Even then, for symmetric i, part
(ii) of Proposition 3 shows that, if ii  0 for i = 1; 2, competition in-
creases both rmsinvestments (see Figure 5). However, with asymmetric
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45°
y1
R (y ,L)1 2
y2
R (y ,H)1 2
R (y ,H)2 1
R (y ,L)2 1
y1Hy1L
y2H
y2L
Figure 5: Strategic Substitutes (Symmetric Case)
rms and strategic substitutes it is simple to construct examples such that
only one rm increases its investments, even though both reaction functions
shift outwards as competition increases.32 Even so, an outward shift of both
reaction functions guarantees a weakly positive e¤ect on both equilibrium in-
vestments as long as reactions to changes in the other players investment are
not too strong. This requirement is captured by the more general condition
(8), which implies both (i) and (ii).
The next result follows from (6). It identies situations where competition
weakly increases the investments of one rm and decreases those of the other
one.
Proposition 4 Suppose for some i 2 f1; 2g and j 6= i, the following condi-
tions hold: (a) ii  0; (b) jj  0; (c) iij  0 and (d) jji  0. Then yi is
weakly increasing in  and yj is weakly decreasing in .
By (a) and (b),  shifts out rm is reaction curve and shifts rm js
reaction curve inwards (Figure 6). By (c) and (d), these direct e¤ects are
32Intuitively, if the shift is more pronounced for rm 1 than for rm 2, and the reaction
function of rm 2 is su¢ ciently steep, then the direct positive e¤ect of competition on
investment for rm 2 is outweighed by the negative e¤ect that rm 1 increases investments,
to which rm 2 reacts by reducing investments.
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45°
y1
R (y ,L)1 2
y2
R (y ,H)1 2
R (y ,H)2 1 R (y ,L)2 1
y1Hy1L
y2H
y2L
Figure 6: Asymmetric E¤ects on Investment Incentives
mutually reinforcing: As both reaction functions are decreasing, an increase
of rm is investment reduces rm js investment incentives and vice versa.
A nice application of Proposition 4 is the Hotelling example (E5). There,
the sign of ii and hence of 
i
i is determined by whether rm i is leader or
laggard, that is, whether c0i < c
0
j or c
0
i > c
0
j . (see Appendix 2). Also, 
i
ij < 0.
Therefore the proposition shows why the sign of @yi
@
di¤ers for leaders and
laggards.
To sum up, this subsection has provided conditions under which the sign
of the direct e¤ect of competition on the reaction curve (the sign of ii)
determines the sign of the e¤ect of competition on equilibrium investments.
Specically, Proposition 3 identied circumstances under which competition
increases both rms investments, whereas Proposition 4 identied condi-
tions under which one rms investment increases, whereas the other rms
investment decreases.
4.2 Determinants of the E¤ects of Competition
In Section 3, I have shown why ii can be positive or negative. This explains
Observation 1 that there is no general relation between competition and equi-
librium investments. Encouraged by Observations 3 and 4, I instead identify
circumstances that lead to a positive or negative relation between competi-
tion and investment, respectively. I will rst deal with general parameters,
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then with specic cases.
4.2.1 General results
The rst result is useful to determine which factors work towards a positive
e¤ect of competition and investment for symmetric rms.33 To this end, I
consider the e¤ect of increasing an arbitrary parameter  that enters the
prot function, and I ask under which circumstances the parameter increase
has a positive e¤ect on the e¤ect of competition on investment.
Proposition 5 Suppose i = i (yi; yj; ;) for some parameter  2 <,
with ii  0. Suppose i is symmetric and di¤erentiable and a symmetric
equilibrium yi(; ) exists. Finally suppose the Hahn stability condition holds.
Then @
@

@yi
@

 0 if and only if
@
@
ln ii 
@
@
ln
    iii + iij (9)
Thus, starting with a situation where competition increases marginal in-
vestment incentives (ii  0), an increase of  strengthens the positive e¤ect
of competition on equilibrium investments if and only if (9) holds.
The result can be understood using (7). A change of  potentially a¤ects
the direct e¤ect of competition  ii
iii
and the multiplier 
i
ii
iii+
i
ij
. A high value
of @
@
ln ii favors a positive e¤ect of  on the direct e¤ect.
34 However, if 
has su¢ ciently strong e¤ects on iii and 
i
ij and thus on the multiplier, the
signs of @
@
 
@yi
@

and ii need not coincide.
4.2.2 Initial E¢ ciency
Observation 3 identies the e¤ect of initial e¢ ciency on @yi
@
. It states that,
in the specic examples E1-E5, the e¤ect of competition on investments is
positive for the leader and negative for the laggard. The latter statement
33An analogous condition for the asymmetric case is simple to derive, but not very
transparent.
34Note that @@

 ii
iii

> 0 if and only if 
i
i
ii
>
iii
iii
.
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generalizes in the sense that, for rms with e¢ ciency levels below a cer-
tain threshold, the e¤ect of competition on investment incentives is always
negative.
Proposition 6 Suppose that rm i is potentially marginal. Then there exists
an " > 0 such that ii (Yi; Yj; ) < 0 on the interval (Y
m
i ; Y
m
i + "), where
Y mi is the e¢ ciency level of the marginal rm.
Recall that a rm is potentially marginal if competition is su¢ ciently
intense and the competitor su¢ ciently strong that the rm produces zero
output if it is su¢ ciently ine¢ cient. Intuitively, Proposition 6 states that,
for rms that are su¢ ciently weak that they barely survive, the cost-pass
through e¤ect and the positive output-sensitivity e¤ect (C2) have very little
value because outputs and margins are close to zero, whereas by (C1) and
(C3) the margin and output e¤ects are negative.35
It is also intuitive why ii tends to be increasing in the initial e¢ ciency
level Y i0 . By (C2), Q
i
 is increasing in Yi. Hence, the output e¤ect (M
i
i Qi) is
increasing in Yi for any xed level ofM ii . This works towards a positive e¤ect
of Y i0 on the e¤ect of competition on investment. Also, because margins are
higher for more e¢ cient rms by (A2), the positive output-sensitivity e¤ect
M i Qii tends to be larger for more e¢ cient rms. Together, these arguments
help to explain why @yi
@
is higher for more e¢ cient rms.
4.2.3 Spillovers
By Observation 4, higher spillovers reduce @yi
@
. The following result identies
the general forces behind this result.
Proposition 7 Suppose that (i) @
3i
@Yi@Yj@
= @
3i
(@Yi)
2@
= @
3i
(@Yj)
2@
= 0 for i =
1; 2, j 6= i or (ii) K 0(0) is su¢ ciently large. As spillovers () increase, ii
falls.
In this proposition, (C4) plays a crucial role. As competition increases,
rms become more concerned about positive e¤ects of spillovers of their in-
35(C4) is not needed for Proposition 6.
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vestment. The other conditions are more subtle, they control e¤ects of un-
clear signs that might interfere with this more fundamental e¤ect.36 Conti-
nuity arguments imply that (i) still holds as long as the corresponding third
derivatives are su¢ ciently small.
4.2.4 Pre-existing competition
It seems intuitive that, while some competition is good for investments, ex-
cessive competitionmay have negative e¤ects, suggesting an inverse-U re-
lation between competition and investment. Indeed, Aghion et al. (1997,
2001) derive such a relation between competition and investment from in-
dustry composition e¤ects (see Section 5).
Example E2 shows that nevertheless a U-shape may arise. (5) helps to
improve the intuition. Set  = . An increase in  =  reduces the nega-
tive e¤ect of  on margins, that is, M i > 0, so that the absolute value of
the negative margin e¤ect (QiiM
i
) becomes smaller.
37 When competition has
already reduced margins substantially, further competition does not reduce
them much more, that is, the negative margin e¤ect essentially disappears.
This favors a positive e¤ect of competition at high initial levels of competi-
tion. Even so, (5) together with (C2) gives two reasons why yi() is some-
times concave. First, with low competition, margins and hence the output
sensitivity e¤ect (MiQii) are high. Second, by (C2), Q
i
i is higher when com-
petition is intense, suggesting that the negative margin e¤ect QiiM
i
 is more
pronounced when competition is intense. Hence, there are forces in favor of
a positive e¤ect of  on @yi
@
and forces favoring a negative e¤ect. Which of
them dominate is unclear a priori.
4.2.5 Summary
This section shows that a high initial e¢ ciency and low spillovers work quite
generally in favor of a positive e¤ect of competition and investment, whereas
36As spillovers increase, the overall cost level becomes lower for any given investment
vector; this potentially a¤ects the relation between competition and marginal investment
incentives. The proof gives a condition that is weaker than both (i) and (ii) and makes
sure such e¤ects do not dominate.
37This property also holds in examples E1 and E3-E5.
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the level of pre-existing competition has no clear e¤ect. Thus, the insights
from the specic examples E1-E5 carry over to any model satisfying the
assumptions of the basic model.
5 Related Literature
The literature on competition and investment is so large that I only address
the most closely related contributions.38
The most comprehensive treatment of two-stage models of investment is
Vives (2008).39 He presents several examples in a unied framework. Apart
from the fact that Vives does not introduce the four transmission channels,
the most conspicuous di¤erence in his treatment of two-stage games without
entry is that he only considers symmetric rms. The di¤erential e¤ects of
competition on leaders and laggards, which are central to my paper, are
therefore not an issue.
Boone (2000) deals with asymmetric rms. He also uses an abstract
approach to dene competition. However, this approach is very di¤erent from
mine. He denes competition in terms of its e¤ect on investment incentives
and on gross prots.40 I dene competition in more basic terms (focusing on
the e¤ects of margins and outputs) and show how the e¤ects on investments
can be understood as a consequence of these more basic properties.
Asymmetry between rms is also crucial for recent growth models. For
instance, Aghion et al. (1997, 2001) use oligopoly models with potentially
asymmetric rms as building blocks.41 These models are similar to the ones I
discussed; however, investments are discrete. Increasing competition (moving
from Cournot to Bertrand or increasing the degree of substitution) has the
38In Schmutzler (2009), I provide a detailed survey, focusing on the theoretical literature.
There I also sketch some of the ideas from the previous version of the current paper in an
informal way. I use the decomposition (5) to organize the examples; I briey report on
the role of the initial e¢ ciency and on some of the extensions of the basic model.
39For elementary models on this topic, see Motta (2004, ch.2).
40An increase in competition takes prots and marginal investment incentives through
up to four regimes which di¤er with respect to the e¤ect of competition on prots and
investment incentives.
41Denicolo and Zanchettin (2009) consider similar quality ladder models where multiple
rms compete as Bertrand or Cournot competitors.
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e¤ect that there is a lot of investment when rms are equally e¢ cient initially,
but less investment when rms are asymmetric. This yields an industry-
composition e¤ect that, even though competition makes rms want to invest
a lot when they are symmetric, this very fact often brings them into states
where they are asymmetric and hence invest less.
In the working paper, I show that, if one goes beyond the framework
introduced in Section 2, one can identify other determinants of the relation
between competition and investment. For instance, building from Schmidt
(1996), I show that separation of ownership and control fosters a positive
relation between competition and cost reductions.42 Related to arguments of
Raith (2003) and Vives (2008), I also argue that low entry costs work towards
such a positive relation.43
Several papers consider investments when an incumbent is threatened
by potential entry. Weinschenk (2010) analyzes how the investments of an
incumbent are a¤ected by the size of the potential entry threat. Segal and
Whinston (2007) show how antitrust polices that restrict the behavior of
incumbents towards the entrant can have ambiguous investment incentives.44
Finally, there is a vast empirical literature that has often been surveyed.45
Most of the papers deal with the relation between innovation and measures
of rm size or market concentration that correspond loosely to concepts of
increasing competition as they are used in the theoretical literature. The
current paper can be used to guide empirical research: By identifying con-
ditions which foster a positive e¤ect between competition and cost-reducing
investments, it provides predictions for the signs of the coe¢ cients of inter-
action terms between competition and other parameters in regressions that
explain process innovations.
42Hart (1983), Hermalin (1992) and Raith (2003) also consider the e¤ects of competition
on managerial e¤orts.
43Also broadly related is the patent race literature (e.g. Loury, 1979; Lee and Wilde,
1980) which analyzes the e¤ects of the number of rms competing for a patent on the
innovation e¤ort.
44In terms of (C1)-(C3), these policies can be regarded as reductions in competition,
even though the authors consider them as pro-competitive.
45Among the many surveys on the subject, Gilbert (2006) is an example that contains
many insightful comments on this literature and the relation to the theoretical models.
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6 Conclusion
Many examples show that, while competition has ambiguous e¤ects on the
investments of symmetric rms, the e¤ects are negative for laggards and are
more likely to become positive for rms that are initially relatively e¢ cient.
Spillovers work towards a negative e¤ect of competition on investment. The
role of the initial level of competition for the e¤ect of further increases in
competition is ambiguous. The paper introduces a general framework to
make the sources of these e¤ects transparent. Specically, it identies four
transmission channels by which competition a¤ects investments, and it shows
how the observations are related to more basic properties of competition.
Among several further conceivable extensions, it would be interesting to
extend the approach to product innovations. A decomposition of investment
incentives analogous to (5) would help to understand how the e¤ects of com-
petition on product innovation di¤er from those on process innovation.46
7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix 1: Proofs
7.1.1 Proof of Proposition 2
By (C4), Qi and M i and hence i are strictly decreasing in Yj for any  > 
such that Qi > 0 and M i > 0. By (C5), ij  0 for  = . Thus, ij > 0
cannot hold everywhere in a neighborhood of .
7.1.2 Proof of Proposition 3
(7) implies
@
@

@yi
@

=
 ii
 
iii + 
i
ij

+ ii
 
iii + 
i
ij
 
iii + 
i
ij
2 . (10)
46Product innovation is less straightforward to model than process innovation. For
instance, an innovating rm may want to continue to use the old product (Greenstein
and Ramey 1998, Chen and Schwartz 2013). Gilbert (2006) summarizes some arguments
pertaining to this discussion, see also Schmutzler (2009).
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Thus @
@

@yi
@

 0 if and only if ii
 
iii + 
i
ij
  ii  iii + iij. By the
Hahn condition and symmetry iii+
i
ij < 0. Applying
@f=@
f()
= @
@
(ln (f())
to the positive-valued functions ii() and  
 
iii () + 
i
ij ()

, one obtains
(9).
7.1.3 Proof of Proposition 6
By (A1) and (C1), Qii M i < 0 whenever both rms have positive outputs;
by (A2) and (C3) M ii  Qi < 0 for Yi < Y i . Moreover M iQii + QiM ii = 0
for Yi = Y mi . Thus, by continuity there exists an " > 0 such that 
i
i =
QiiM
i
 +M
i
iQ
i
 +M
iQii +Q
iM ii < 0 for Yi 2 (Y mi ; Y mi + ").
7.1.4 Proof of Proposition 7
@2i (yi; yj; )
@yi@
=
@2i
 
Y 0i + yi + yj; Y
0
j + yj + yi; 

@Yi@
+
@2i
 
Y 0i + yi + yj; Y
0
j + yj + yi; 

@Yj@
.
Therefore,
@3i (yi; yj; )
@yi@@
= (11)
@2i
@Yj@
+ yj

@3i
(@Yi)
2 @
+
@3i
@Yi@Yj@

+ yi
 
@3i
@Yi@Yj@
+
@3i
(@Yj)
2 @
!
.
If (i) holds, @
3i(yi;yj ;)
@yi@@
= @
2i
@Yj@
< 0. Next, consider (ii). If yi = yj = 0,
then @
2i
@Yj@
< 0. K 0(yi) is bounded below by K 0(0) by convexity. Therefore,
for any given functional form of i, as K 0(0) increases, the best response yi
converges to zero. Hence, by continuity of @
2i
@Yj@
, @
3i(yi;yj ;)
@yi@@
< 0.
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7.2 Appendix 2: The Examples
I provide the equilibrium outputs, margins and investments for E1-E5.47
Assume that Yi = 1   ci in E1-E4, that is, c = 1. With the formulas below
in place, the claims in the main text become straightforward to derive.48
With Bertrand competition and inverse demand D1,
Qi (Yi; Yj; ) =
 
2  2Yi   Yj 
4  2  1  2 ; M i (Yi; Yj; ) =
 
2  2Yi   Yj
4  2
yi() =  
 12Y 0i + 8Y 0j + 162Y 0i   63Y 0j   74Yi + 5Y 0j + 6Y 0i
 762 + 454   116 + 8 + 36
With Cournot competition and inverse demand D1,
Qi (Yi; Yj; ) = M
i (Yi; Yj; ) =
2Yi   Yj
4  2 .
yi() =  
12Y 0i   8Y 0j   42Y 0i + 23Y 0j
402   124 + 6   36
With Bertrand competition and inverse demand D2,
Qi (Yi; Yj; ) =
 
2  2Yi   Yj 
4  2 (1  ) ;
M i (Yi; Yj; ) =
 
2  2Yi   Yj
4  2 .
yi() =
Y 0i
  12 + 4 + 162   74 + 5 + 6   43+ Y 0j  8   63 + 5
60 + 122   443 + 34 + 115   6   7   36
47Again, I assume the asymmetries are su¢ ciently small that the respective quantities
are non-negative.
48A more detailed description of the calculation, including the arguments for  > 0, is
available as supplementary material.
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With Cournot competition and inverse demand D2,
Qi (Yi; Yj; ) =
(1 + ) (2Yi   Yj) 
4  2 ;
M i (Yi; Yj; ) =
2Yi   Yj
4  2 .
yi() =  
Y 0i
 
12 + 8   82   43+ Y 0j  24   8   82 + 23
24 + 362   83   124 + 6   36
For the Hotelling case, dening  = 1  t,
Qi (Yi; Yj; ) = (Yj   Yi + 3 (   1)) =6 (   1) ;
M i (Yi; Yj; ) = (Yi   Yj   3 (   1)) =3.
yi() =
9 (   1)  3Y 0i + 3Y 0j + 1
54 (   1) + 6
7.3 Appendix 3: Cournot vs. Bertrand
The framework can be adapted to the comparison of investments for Cournot
( = ) and Bertrand ( = ) competition with demand function D1 and
D2.49 To avoid misunderstandings, I replace the substitution parameter with
b. For D1, Figure 7 shows that investments are higher for soft (Cournot) com-
petition, though the di¤erence trivially approaches zero as b does, because
then both cases correspond to monopolies. As for the previous examples, an
increase in  is compatible with (C1)-(C4). Negative margin and cost-pass-
through e¤ects dominate the positive output and output-sensitivity e¤ects.
Also, even though the gures do not address this case, it can be shown
that, for asymmetric rms, the general patterns that hold for increasing sub-
stitutability reoccur: Competition (moving from Cournot to Bertrand com-
petition) has a negative e¤ect on the investments of rms that lag far behind
the rival, but a positive e¤ect on those that are substantially ahead of the ri-
val. Also, marginal increases in the spillover parameter (starting from  = 0)
have a negative e¤ect on the di¤erences between investments under Bertrand
49Even though  does not a¤ect demand functions qi
 
pi; pj

, it a¤ects equilibrium
outputs, margins and prots. Therefore the termsQi (Yi; Yj ; ),M i (Yi; Yj ; ), i (Yi; Yj ; )
still make sense.
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Figure 7: Cournot vs. Bertrand competition
and Cournot competition, respectively.
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